Equitable Relief Against Nuisances by de Funiak, William Q.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 3
1949
Equitable Relief Against Nuisances
William Q. de Funiak
University of San Francisco
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
de Funiak, William Q. (1949) "Equitable Relief Against Nuisances," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 38 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol38/iss2/3
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST NUISANCES
By WILLIAm Q. DE FUNIAK*
The definition of a nuisance may be prefaced by the perhaps too
obvious remark that it is to be distinguished from a trespass, which
is some direct injury to or upon real property committed by one not
in any privity of estate or title with the owner or possessor. Such
direct injury is usually some actual physical or tangible contact or
invasion on or below the surface by the trespasser himself or by some
force projected by him. 1 A nuisance has been defined as an unlawful
act which causes injury to a person in the enjoyment of his estate,
unaccompanied by an actual invasion of the property itself 2  The
foregoing distinction has been frequently and carefully observed by
many courts of equity, although admittedly this is not always the case.
Thus, it has been rather common to describe an encroachment, not
upon the land itself but upon the space above the land, as a nuisance,3
although such determination is not uniform. A matter which would
not seem to be in accord is the wrong which has developed in recent
years, the injury to the plaintiff from continued low level airplane
flights across his land which seems to be described by the courts as a
trespass rather than a nuisance.4 There are other instances of some-
what longer standing, where the courts have had difficulty in deter-
mining whether there is an actual invasion of the property itself, as
where damage from allowing imponded waters to escape or percolate
to the plaintiff's property This is sometimes described as a nui-
sance,r sometimes as a trespass. 6
From one standpoint, it might be considered immaterial what the
wrong is called, since equity will grant relief in any event where the
circumstances warrant and where there is no adequate remedy at
* LL.B., Univ. of Virginia, LL.M., Univ. of San Francisco; Professor of Law,
University of San Francisco.
'See de Fumak, Equitable Protection against Waste and Trespass, 36 Ky. L. J.
255 (1948).
MFRwIN, PINCIPLES OF EQUITY 431 (1895).
0 "The wrong here complained of was an enroachment, not upon plaintiff's land,
but upon the space above the land, and therefore was not a trespass but a nuisance."
Kafka v. Bozo, 191 Cal. 746, 218 P 753, 29 A.L.R. 833 (1923), citing WOOD,
NuISANCFs, 33 (3 Ed.) and noted 33 YALE L. J. 557 (1924).
See Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (1945), noted 58 HARV. L. REV.
1252 (1945); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc.,-Mass.- 42 N.E. 2d 575 (1942);
noted 22 B.U.L. RFv. 625 (1942), 28 CORN. L. Q. 200 (1943).
As a nuisance, see Nelson v. Robinson, 47 Cal. App. 2d 520, 118 P 2d 350 (1941).
As a trespass, see Rueckert v. Sicking, 20 Ohio App. 162, 153 N.E. 129 (1923).
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law However, the existence of an adequate remedy at law by way
of ejectment may exist in the case of a trespass where it would not in
case of a nuisance, so that what the tort is termed may become of
some moment.
7
Returning, however, to the definition of nuisance, further expan-
sion of it is desirable. For, as writers have pointed out, the term
nuisance is used to designate two distinct groups of wrongs: one, the
use of his land by the defendant so as wrongfully to interfere with the
plaintiffs reasonable use and enjoyment of hIs land, as by the creation
of unpleasant, unhealthful or dangerous conditions; and two, the inter-
ference with some easement or other incorporeal right of the plaintiff
upon or appurtenant to land.8
The discussion and definitions so far given are applicable to the
so-called private nuisance, as distinguished from a public nuisance.
The former is an injury to one or more particular individuals in dis-
tinction from men in general. The latter is an injury to the public gen-
erally or to a community or neighborhood or even to some considerable
number of persons.9 To the extent that the public nuisance is espe-
cially injurious to one member of the public or of the community or
of the neighborhood, as causing him special damage, it is as to him a
private nuisance. Just in what way this one member of the public
or of the community must suffer injury, so as to constitute a private
nuisance as to him, is not always clear. That it should in its nature
be special and peculiar to him is a usual view,10 but differences in
degree have also been recognized.i The public nuisance encom-
passes a wide field and involves such matters as the protection of
public rights of way and navigation, public welfare, public health,
public safety and public morals. Hence, many writers and courts
prefer to refer to the subject as the protection of the public or social
welfare or the like, rather than by the term public nuisance. Whatever
designation is applied, it deserves separate consideration. Accord-
ingly the discussion considers first the so-called private nuisance.
"Conflict of opinion as to whether act is an adverse user or a dispossession,
with reference to availability of legal action of ejectment, see discussion by WALSil,
TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), Sec. 31.
8 See, e. g., MCCLINTOCI,, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY (1936), 232; WALSH, op. cit. supra,
note 7, 170.
'See MERWIN, op. cit. supre note 2, pp. 432, 433.
10 Wesson v. Washburn, 95 Mass. 95 (1866).
1 Gulf States Steel Co. v. Beveridge, 209 Ala. 473, 96 So. 587 (1923). See also
MCCLINTOCK, Op. cit. supra note 8, p. 289: LAWRENCE, Equrry JURISPRUDFNCE (1929),
p. 954; WALSH, op. cit. supra note 7 pp. 210, 211.
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WHEN NUISANCE EXISTENT: SPECIFIC AcTs
What is a use of land so as wrongfully to interfere with a neigh-
bor s reasonable use and enjoyment of Ins property is not subject to
precise definition. What is a wrongful interference in one locality
may not be in another. Creation of a condition or manner of using
property in a manufacturing or industrial district may not there con-
stitute a nuisance but if done in a residential district may be a nui-
sance. What is done in a residential district may there constitute a
nuisance but would not constitute one if done in a rural area. The
most that can be said, perhaps, is that to constitute a nuisance, the use
must be such as to produce a tangible and appreciable injury to the
neighboring property or such as to render its enjoyment especially
uncomfortable, inconvenient or dangerous. 2
Nuisances of the type constituting an interference with the plain-
tiff's reasonable use and enjoyment of hIs property are of many and
varied kmds.iS Some illustrations are the generation of noxious, un-
pleasant or unhealthful odors,i 4 or causing smoke and dust,i5 or caus-
ing noise"' or vibrations.17 Again, it may be obstructions or encroach-
ments on neighboring property above the surface,is or permitting the
escape or percolation or seepage of imponded waters or of sewage
or the like onto neighboring property, 9 or by storage of explosives or
maintenance of other dangerous conditions.
20
Illustrations of the nuisance involving interference with an ease-
ment or other incorporeal right are such matters as interfering with
" See Hurlburt v. McKone, 55 Conn. 31, 10 At. 164 (1886); Campbell v. Seaman,
63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567 (1876).
13 Besides the illustrations immediately following are others cited or referred to
throughout this article. In addition, numerous annotations will be found in A.L.R.
ielating to specific matters or conditions as nuisances.
" Pollution of air in residential district by gas reservoir. Roiano v. Birming-
ham Ry., L. & P Co., 182 Ala. 335, 62 So. 677, 46 L.R.A.N.S. 642, ANN. CAS. 1915D
776 (1913).
Sulphtiric acid gas from brick kiln injurious to trees and shrubbery. Campbell
v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567 (1876).
15Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P 928, 38
L.R.A.N.S. 436 (1911).
' Assembly of God Church v. Bradley, (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 SAV 2d 696 (1946);
Pane v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P 2d 552 (1944).
17 Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N. J. Eq. 616, 25 AtI. 374 (1892).
i Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 P 753, 29 A.L.R. 833 (1923), noted 33 YALE
L. J. 557 (1924).
1, Percolation from artificial canal, see Nelson v. Robinson, 47 Cal. App. 2d 520,
1ISP 2d 350 (1941).
See Comment, 95 U. or PA. L. REv. 781 (1947), as to absolute nuisance theory
in Pennsylvania.
"I People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59, 16 L.R.A. 443, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 433 (1891), stored explosives.
See annotation, Pesthouse or contagious disease hospital as nuisance, 48 A.L.R.
518.
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a right of way,21 interference with ingress or egress,- interference
with a right of lateral support,2 3 and interference with riparian ease-
ments in streams as by acts of pollution24 or diversion of the waters.2
The easement interfered with may be an easement of right, or of ne-
cessity, or acquired by grant or agreement.
Easements of light and windows, so-called, as of right are not
generally recognized in this country,20 although they are aquirable by
grant or agreement and when so acquired are entitled to equitable
protection. "7  There is, however, some recognition of easements of
light as a matter of right in favor of those whose property fronts or
abuts on public streets.2 8 It is frequently customary to couple with
the term "light" that of "air", so that statements of the rule read that
easements of light and air do not exist as of right. But while techni-
cally there may be no protectible easement of air as of right, it is
clear that the matter is reached in another way As has been already
indicated, pollution of the air by obnoxious odors, smoke, dust, etc., is
enjomable where it interferes with the reasonable use and enjoyment
of the plaintiff's property So, though the matter is not reachable as
interference with an easement it is reachable under the type of nui-
sance constituting interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment
of property
AMICIPATED NUISANCE
While generally the nuisance is already existent at the time the
plaintiff seeks equitable relief, the nuisance need not actually exist in
order to warrant injunction. The reasonable probability of injury from
an anticipated nuisance will warrant injunction in a proper case.2"1
Anticipation of a nuisance may be more easily determined where there
21 Stallard v. Cushing, 76 Cal. 472, 18 P 427 (1888); Tucker v. Howard, 12)
Mass. 361 (1880).
Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeterica Co.,---Fla.-- 32 So. 2d 727 (19-18).
2 Trowbridge v. True, 52 Conn. 190, 52 Am. Rep. 579 (1884).
There is very little equitable authority on this question, according to AVASI.I,
TREATISE ON EquiTy (1930), p. 183. But see 'MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1895),
pp. 434, 435. And see Universal Realty Co. v. Fesler, 179 Md. 635, 22 A. 2d 448 (1941).
as to right of support from party wall.
2- Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297, 52 Am. Rep. 763 (1885); Farley v.
Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265, 9 A.L.R. 933 (1920). See an-
notation, Injunction Against Pollution, 46 A.L.R. 8.
- Harding v. Stamford Water Co., 41 Conn. 87 (1874); Amsterdam Knitting Co.
v. Dean, 162 N.Y. 278, 56 N.E. 757 (1900).
-This was remarked upon over 50 years ago by MERWIN, PRINCII'LFS OF EotuiN
(1895), p. 435, pointing out that the rule is otherivise in England and formerly in
,Massachusetts.
- Hennen v. Deveny, 71 W Va. 629, 77 S.E. 142. L.R.A. 1917A 524 (1913).
See. e.g., Lahr v. Metropolitan Ry., 104 N. Y. 261, 10 N.E. 528 (1887).
McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 120 Okla. 40, 248 P 561, 51 A.L.R.
1251 (1926).
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has been past conduct to judge by For example, the construction
of a church has been enjoined on the ground that its manner of use
would constitute a nuisance, where past conduct of the congregation
in holding revival meetings at night on the premises in a tent had
consisted of singing and shouting in loud voices heard as far as half
a mile away 30
But relief is not warranted if it does not appear that the danger
to the plaintiff is real and immediate and that the injury will be ma-
terial.3 Where a thing or condition is not in itself a nuisance, that is,
is not describable as a nuisance per se, but will result in a nuisance
only from its manner of maintenance or operation, its establishment
or construction should not be enjoined merely upon the possibility
that its management or operation could be such as to make it a
nuisance.3 2 In the case of the church previously referred to, the
church in itself was not a nuisance per se but its manner of use, rea-
sonably to be foretold in advance, would constitute a nuisance.
PRESCRIPTION-COMING TO A NUISANCE
Whether a right may be acquired by prescription to maintain a
nuisance is a question upon which the authorities are confused. Upon
analysis, the logical view develops that no such right is acquirable. 3 3
Where one maintains a certain condition upon his land, such condition
cannot constitute a nuisance to someone else until someone is affected
by the condition. Suppose that the defendant maintains a certain
condition upon his land and has done so for many years. The plain-
tiff now acquires land in the vicinity and moves upon it. He then
discovers that his reasonable use and full enjoyment of his property
is seriously affected by the condition maintained by the defendant
and will continue to be so affected. The condition may not previously
have been injurious to anyone, but as to the plaintiff it constitutes a
freshly instituted injurv As to him, it has not been maintained long
enough to give any so-called prescriptive right to the defendant.
3 4  If
:'Assembly of God Church v. Bradley', (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 SAN 2d 696 (1946).
',' Vaszil V. Molnar. 133 N. J. EQ. 577, 33 A. 2d 743 (1943), where the apparent
intention of the defendant to keep chickens in his back yard, adjoining the plain-
tiff'.. prenises. was held not to create an apprehension of a nuisance.
;11 Collins v. Lamer, -- Ga. -- 40 S.E. 2d 424 (1946), noted 9 GA. BAR JOUR. 325
(1947): Essick v. Shillam, 347 Pa. 373, 32 A. 2d 416, 146 A.L.R. 1399 (1943).
Construction of airport not enjoined since airport was not a nuisance per se
and would become one only if improperly managed. Warren Tp. v. City of Detroit,
-Mich.-14 N.W 2d 134 (1944), noted 29 MiNN. L. REv. 38 (1944).
See Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W 2d 33, 167 A.L.R. 1361 (1943).
I Hall v. Budde, supra note 33. See annotation, "Coming to a nuisance" as a
defense or operating as an estoppel, 167 A.L.R. 164; Comment, Defense of unoc
cupied property against nuisance, 21 NOTRE DArE LAW 358 (1946).
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it be maintained that the prescriptive right of the defendant has been
acquired against the land of the plaintiff before he obtained or en-
tered upon it, this would permit the defendant virtually to condemn
to his own private purposes and uses all the property surrounding him
and allow the defendant to limit the uses to which the surrounding
property could be put.35 Even in the case of vacant land already
owned but not yet occupied by the plaintiff, injunctive relief has been
allowed the plaintiff on the ground that future enjoyment and benefit
of is land would be interferred with when it came to be occupied.3 ,
If the plaintiff at the time of acquiring his property is aware of
the condition maintained by the defendant, is he estopped or in any
way equitably barred from seeking relief? The mere fact that he
knew of the condition is in itself no indication that he knew or realized
the effect it would have upon him in the ownership or occupancy of
his property Even if the plaintiff knew of the effect it would have
upon his use and enjoyment of his property, he is not thereby estopped
from seeking equitable relief, if his use of h:s property rather than
the defendant's use of the defendant's property is in conformity with
the general use of property in the locality It must always be borne
in mind that the general nature or use of the neighborhood may affect
right to relief. One could not move into what is a manufacturing
neighborhood for a residential purpose only and insist on the preva-
lence of the same conditions obtaining in a residential neighborhood.3
But has a defendant acquired a prescriptive right against a plain-
tiff who has actually occupied nearby property for, say, tventy years
and not within that time objected to the condition maintained by the
defendant? No, for what actually is the case is that the plaintiff is
estopped or barred by laches from obtaining equitable relief. If the
defendant is described as having acquired a prescriptive right, it is
against the plaintiff only and personally If the latter now sold to a
third person, the third person would be faced with a condition that
was a nuisance as to him as being freshly instituted, which is the
situation just previously discussed. In regard to the foregoing, it is
to be noticed that even though the plaintiff has occupied his property
for years in the vicinity of the defendant, during which period the
defendant has maintained a certain condition, the condition so main-
tained may not during that period have constituted any nuisance to
3 See, especially, Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239. 118
P 928, 38 L.R.A.N.S. 436 (1911); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep.
567 (1876).
1Romano v. Birmingham Ry., L. & P Co., 182 Ala. 335, 62 So. 677, 46
L.R.A.N.S. 642, Ann. Cas. 1915D 776 (1913).
' Effect of location of property, see annotation, 167 A.L.R. 1364, at p. 1378
et seq.
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the plaintiff. But upon the plaintiff making another but reasonable
use of his property, the condition now interferes with him. If such is
the case, it may then for the first time become a nuisance as to him
and be enjomable and no so-called prescriptive right exists in favor
of the defendant 8
So far the discussion has concerned the type of nuisance that is
an interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment of property
Where the nuisance results from interference with an easement, it
appears common to declare that a prescriptive right to interfere may
be acquired, or that the easement may be lost by prescription. In a
situation, .for instance, where riparian owners are entitled to use a
certain amount of water from a stream and the upper owner takes
more than he is entitled to, to the detriment of the lower owner, who
does not object for many years, it might well be argued that the upper
owner has acquired a prescriptive right to take the additional water
and that the lower owner has, correspondingly, lost his right to the
former amount of water by reason of prescription. But, on the other
hand, is this any more than a matter of estoppel or laches so far as
concerns thIs particular lower riparian owner? If he now sells his
riparian property to a third person, is this "prescription" effective
against the third person? Ile has no notice from anything of record
and may have no actual notice otherwise. There is no reason why
the rule should be any different here from that in the case of inter-
ference with use and enjoyment of property 3sa
RELIEF AVAILABLE
If the circumstances justify it, the injured party may abate the
nuisance himself, that is, resort to self help. This may be feasible in
some instances and warranted by immediate necessity, as where egress
to a highway is a matter of right, is necessary and has been wrong-
fully interferred with by the padlocking of a gate.39  This right to
resort to self help is sometimes recognized and provided for by sta-
tute."' Whether or not it has been recognized by statute, it has been
" For example, the defendant for years maintained two mortars against a parzy
wall for the purposes of pounding loaf sugar, etc. Upon the plaintiff thereafter
erecting his consultig room next to the party wall, the condition then became an
enoiable nuisance. Stirges v. Bridge,, 11 Ch. Div. 852 (1879).
'4 Cases on prescriptive right to pollute stream, see annotation 46 A.L.R. 68.
" I can recall smashing a padlock myself, upon an occasion when my family s
only access to the highway was so blocked. No further attempt was ever made by
the offender to repeat the nuisance.
'As an illustration of statutory authorization of self help, see CAL. Civ. CODE,
s ecs. 3501-503. It is specified that the abatement ma) be accomplished without
%ublecting the injured party to liabilit, for breach of the peace. Where the
ntuisance results from mere omission by the wrongdoer, notice to hin of the iten-
tion to abate it is required.
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uniformity recognized by courts of equity as a proper method of abat-
ing a nuisance where the circumstances warrant. 41 We sometimes
find courts of equity denying the aid of equity on the ground that the
remedy by way of self help is entirely adequate as a means of relief.
Denial on such ground may well be confined to situations not produc-
tive of substantial injury 4- There is no doubt, however, that any
right of self help should be exercised with caution for it may well
lead to actual hostilities of some sort, with the resultant calling of
a policeman, where one is available, who will probably be totally
ignorant of the injured party's right to use self help. Resort to the
equity powers of a court, if permissible, may provide a more dignified
method of procedure.
But as in the case of trespass, the jurisdiction of equity depends
upon whether the nuisance is continuous or repeated or merely casual
and temporary In the former case, continued or recurring nature of
the nuisance, threatening permanent or irreparable injury, renders the
remedy at law inadequate and warrants equitable relief. In the latter
case, the injured party is left to his remedy at law In addition to the
award of equitable relief, the plaintiff may also recover damages. The
amount of damages may be fixed by the court where the exact extent
of detriment is not susceptible of exact pecuniary compensation.4 3
So far as concerns the requisite of property or a property right
to warrant equitable jurisdiction, it will be seen that this requisite is
definitely present in the case of a private nuisance.
Acts constituting nuisances are frequently described by statute
as crimes but this does not prevent resort to the aid of equity where
the remedy obtainable through criminal proceedings is not so speedy,
efficient and adequate -as that obtainable in equity to prevent irrepar-
able or permanent injury 44
Where the question is raised as to whether the act or condition
constitutes a nuisance or as to the right, title or interest of the plain-
tiff as a warrant or basis for obtaining equitable relief, must this ques-
tion be settled at law before he may proceed for equitable relief?45
41 Where the injured party has not encouraged the maintenance of the nuisance
he may act to remove it without giving notice of his intention. Otherwise, he shouhl
give notice,?f,,his intention to resort to self help, according to the view followed in
many jurisdictions.
42See Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213. 5 S.E. 2d 492, 128 A.L.R. 1217 (1939). Avail-
ability of self help not preventing obtaining of equitable aid, see Gostina v. Ryland,
116 Wash. 228, 199 P 298, 18 A.L.R. 650 (1921).
1Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 P 581, 26
L.R.A.N.S. 183, 21 Ann. Cas. 1247 (1910).
44 See Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P 513, 1 Ant. Cas. 35 (1904).
IsSee Lewis, Injunctions against Nuisances and Rule Requiring Plaintiff to
Establish his Right at Law, 47 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 289 (1908). See also McRae, Devel.
opinent of Nutsance in Early Common Law. 1 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1948).
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Where law and equity are administered in separate courts, it would
seem that the plaintiff would first have to have the question of his
right, title or interest or the existence of a nuisance decided in his
favor in a court of law, as in the case of trespass. But while this re-
quirement may be found in some of those junsdictions, 46 it appears
to have been abandoned or ignored in others.47  In code states, of
course, merger of law and equity has done away with any difficulty
by permitting disposition of all questions arising, both legal and
equitable, in the same proceeding. But even so, in the code states,
the matter of having a jury determine the legal question raised seems
generally to be ignored and the court, in the exercise of its equitable
powers, determines all questions.4 8
Where maintenance of the particular condition alleged to be a
nuisance has been authorized by law, as by legislative or other official
license, is it nevertheless enjoinable? Where the authorization permits
construction or maintenance or operation of something which does
not necessarily produce an injurious result, but such result flows from
a particular construction or maintenance or operation, the authonza-
tion is no defense to the application for equitable relief.4 9 But where
an act has been expressly authorized which must inevitably result
in injury, what would otherwise be a nuisance is said to be legalized.
The defenses customarily available in suits for equitable relief
against torts, such as laches, unclean hands, and balancing of equities
or conveniences, are available in suits to enjoin acts alleged to consti-
tute nuisances. Since I have discussed these generally at another
place, I do not include a repetition here. 51
PUBLIC NUISANCES
A public nuisance is defined as such an inconvenience or trouble-
some offense as annoys, or infringes on the rights of, the whole coi-
munity or some appreciable portion of it and not merely of some par-
"'See Parks v. Parks, 121 Me. 580, 119 A. 533 (1922).
' See Phelps v. Winch, 309 Il1. 158, 140 N.E. 847 (1923); Sullivan v. Jones &
L.aughlin, 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904).
Waiver bN not raising question in equity court, see Coast Co. v. Spring Lake, 56
N. J. Eq. 615. 36 A. 21 (1898).4
'See discussion by Professor Durkee, CASES ON EQUITY (1928), pp. 453, 454,
notes.
"'See Katencamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal. 2d 765, 59 P 2d 473 (1936).
1 See Sayre v. Newark, 60 N. J. Eq. 361, 45 A. 985, 48 L.R.A. 722, 83 Am. St. Rep.
629 (1899): Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., -- Tex. -- 193 S.V 2d 517 (1946),
noted 25 Trx. L. REv. 96 (1946).
zt See de Funak, Requisites for Equitable Protection Against Torts, 37 Ky. L.
J. 29 (Nov., 1948).
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ticular person.5 2 The effectiveness of the interposition of equity and
of its injunctive relief to prevent or to put a stop to such a situation is
readily apparent.sa
Somewhat briefly, it may be said that the first instances of protec-
hon of the public in early English equity jurisprudence involved the
public health and purprestures. 54 That equitable interposition is to
be restricted to these matters has been indicated in some of the older
American cases.55 However, in most jurisdictions today the extent to
which the jurisdiction and aid of equity may be invoked encompasses
a wide range involving the public welfare generally As well as pro-
tection of the public health,5 6 equity protects such matters as the pub-
lic safety,5 7, property generally of the public,58 public morals5", and
the like. 0°
Because of the protection of the rights of the public or a large
part thereof is involved, it has seemed preferable to many courts and
legal writers to term the matter the equitable protection of the public
or social welfare rather than equitable protection against public
nuisances. Since the extent of equitable protection of the public has,
in most jurisdictions, gone far beyond the original consideration of
what constituted a public nuisance, there may well be justification for
the preferred terminology referred to.
Since the jurisdiction of equity has been so dependent upon the
protection of property right,"5 it is common to find the older cases
expressing an unwillingness to enjoin as a public nuisance a situation
which contravened public policy or threatened the general or social
See Moore. Cyc. LAWv DicT., 3d Ed.
Discussion, see Leflar, Equilable Protection of Public l'rongs, 14 TLx. L. REv.
427 (1936).
-,IALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), Sec. 37, CHA1-EE, CASES ON EQUITABLE Rr
LIEF AGAINST TORTS (1924), pp. 438-440. Purprestures, see post.
3-See, e.g., State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo. App. 413 (1883).
51 Village of Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 44 N IV 197 (1890).
5'See State ex rel. Hopkins v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 P 686, 25 A.L.R. 1212
(1921), error disinzssd 258 U.S. 181, 42 S. Ct. 277 66 L. Ed. 550 (1921).
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 S. Ct. 618, 51 L. Ed. 1038
(1906).
Injunction to protect property interests of state in food fish in coastal waters
on ground remedy at law inadequate, see People v. Monterey, etc., Co., 195 Cal. 5 1",
234 P 398. 38 A.L.R. 1186 (1925).
See discussion, post.
60 Enjoining n us IOuS practices considered injurious to public welfare, %ee State
ex rel. Smith v. McMahon. 128 Kan. 772, 280 P 996. 66 A.L.R. 1072 (1929), noted 30
COL. L. Ri.v. 125, 15 CORN. L. Q. 472, 43 HARV. L. REv'. 499, 14 MINN. L. Rrv. 690. 39
YALE L. J. 590: Commonwealth v. Continental Co., 275 Ky. 238, 121 SAV 2d 19
(1938), noted 1 LA. L. RE,. 619; State ex rel. Goff v. O'Neil. 205 Miun. 366, 286 N.W
316 (1939). noted 34 ILL. L. RE\v. 397. Contra, see People ex rel. Stephens v. Sec
conibe. 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 P 725 (1930), noted 18 CALir. L. Rrv. 328.
01 Aspects of this have been discussed by me in previous articles, 36 Kv. L. J. 7
(1947), 37 K-. L. J. 29 (1948).
RELIEF AGAINST NUISANCES
welfare rather than threatening property rights.62 Even where the
courts have inclined to protect the public welfare or morals or the like,
it has frequently been pitched upon the property element by stating
that the court is enjoining the use of his property by the defendant
in a manner that would threaten the public welfare, morals or the
like."3 Although this reasoning has frequently seemed to soothe the
court anJ make it feel that it has not been forgetting the property
element as a basis of equity jurisdiction, it will be noticed that the
reasoning is somewhat twisted. If property is a necessary element
of equity jurisdiction, it has been the fact that property or rights
theren are being protected from irreparable injury However, what
may be termed the development of social consciousness in many courts
has brought about their exerc:se of equity jurisdiction to protect the
public or social welfare, without regard to the question of property,64
and we thus find a situation in which definitely equity acts as a source
of the only adequate relief without regard to the historic but some-
times crippling limitation upon its exercise of jurisdiction.
But leaving aside the property element, many courts display a
great deal of caution about determining that acts or conduct constitute
a public nuisance, especially as being injurious to public morals.
Since standards of morality may change from one period to another
or differ between one state and another, this cautious attitude is
understandable. ';-- Changing standards certainly tend to make decis-
ions of another period or of another jurisdiction doubtful authority
PURPRESTURES
Reference has already been made to purprestures and, somewhat
belatedly, we turn to a brief consideration of them. A purpresture is
defined as an enclosure or appropriation to his own use by an indi-
vidual of a part of a common or public domain. Usually, it involves
enclosure or appropriation of a public right of way or public right of
navigation."" Strictly, unless such enclosure or appropriation inter-
, See e.g..Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 371 (1817).
Repass %. Commonwealth 131 Kv. 807 11.5 S.V 1101 (1909).
', State e% rel. Smith v. McMahon, supra note 60.
"'No invasion of a property right need be shown in order to justify the use -A
an injunction to abate a public nuisance at the instance of. the state. The rule
as to property rights applies only when the complainant is a private individual at-
tempting to abate a public nuisance." State v. Phoenix Say. Bank & Trust Co., 198
P 2d 1018 (Ariz., 1918).
Responsibility declared to rest upon the legislature to determine standards of
public morality, violations of which shall constitute public nuisances, see People v.
Lin. 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P 2d 472 (1941), where operation of gambling house was
,ought to be enjoined.
,,,See MooRw Cvc. LAW DIcT., 3d Ed.
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feres with the public's use of the right of way or navigation, it is not
a public nuisance.
Some American cases, particularly the earlier ones, influenced by
English decisions, have taken the view that if the purpresture does
not constitute a public nuisance or does not cause irreparable injury
or does not interfere with legislative control, equitable relief is not
available to the state and the legal remedy of ejectment must be pur-
sued. 67 The better view is that a purpresture need not also be a
public nuisance to warrant equitable relief where that is the most
adequate means of relief to the state or to the people of the state."
Where it is a public nuisance in that it interferes with the public in
its use of public rights of way or navigation, injunctive relief undoubt-
edly is proper to prevent this interference. 69
AcT oR CONDUCr AS A CimE
The mere fact that an act or conduct is in violation of a penal statute
does not render such act or conduct a public nuisance. Equity does not
enjoin an act merely because its commission will constitute a crime.70
The act or conduct must be such as would constitute a public nuisance
even m the absence of statute, to warrant enjoining the act or con-
duct.7 ' If to allow the commission or continued commission of
certain acts or conduct will result in irreparable injury to the public,
equity will enjoin such commission even though the commission there-
of is described by statute as a crime.72 However, it is not unusual
for statutes to provide that an act is a crime and, as well, a public
nuisance and enjoinable as such. Indeed, by statute an act may be
declared to constitute a public nuisance although previously, in the
absence of statute, it had not been considered to constitute a public
nuisance.
" People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379 (1866).
See STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th Ed., 1918), Sec. 1248 et seq.
Injunction denied where purpresture did not constitute public nuisance and
defendant had easement as riparian owner to reach navigable portion of stream, see
People v. Mould, 37 App. Div. 35. 55 N.Y.S. 453 (1899).
1 Hibbard & Co. v. Chicago, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N.E. 256 (1898).
Unusual illustration of purpresture, see Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass.
426, 55 N.E. 77, 47 L.R.A. 314 (1899).
"I People v. Steele, 4 Cal. App. 2d 206, A0 P 2d 959, 41 P 2d 946 (1935); Corn-
monwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, 109 A. 789, 9 A.L.R. 922 (1920).
71 It is apparent that it is often sought to prevent certain conduct by means of
equitable remedies where resort to criminal prosecutions have proved unavailing
because of unwillingness of juries to convict. Whether this resort to equit will
proce successful will usually depend upon the attitude and belief and prejudices of
the judges. Compare People v. Steele, supra note 70, with People v. Laman. 277
N. Y. 368, 14 N.E. 2d 439 (1938), noted 24 CORN. L. Q. 118, 25 VA. L. REv. 99.




Suits to enjoin public nuisances ordinarily are provided by statute
to be brought by the state attorney general or other designated public
officer, in the name of the state or of the people of the state. Usually
the suit may not be brought by and in the name of individuals, al-
though the suit is frequently brought in the name of the state on the
information of (ex relatione) the party or parties immediately inter-
ested in or affected by the nuisance.73 On occasion, by statute, the
suit may be brought by and in the name of members of the public
interested or affected by the nuisance.
7 4
"See citations in preceding subdivisions.
"A% in Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55 (1889).

